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This paper presents a novel characterization of new 
media art together with an exploration of some key 
aspects of its practice: I propose that new media art’s 
defining characteristics are media appropriation and 
explicitation. With media appropriation I refer to the 
dialectal inscription into the art practice of the 
knowledge that allows for some particular 
technological production. I also propose that new 
media art’s language is constructed in part via the 
explicitation of certain aspects of more ‘traditional’ art, 
and that this explicitation allows for a construction of a 
new vocabulary. Examples of this are the explicitation 
of randomness, interaction, programming, or of the 
role that tools and instruments play, among others. 
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1 | INTRODUCTION 
“Technologies often tend to develop faster 
than the rhetoric evaluating them, and we are 
still in the process of developing description 
for arts using digital technology as a 
medium—in social, economic, aesthetic 
respects” (Paul, 2003). 
Art using technology as a medium is referred to under 
a number of names and definitions. New media art, 
digital art, computer art, interactive art, art and 
technology, media arts, and electronic art, are found 
in the literature and are also used by artists and 
designers themselves (Tribe, Jana, & Grosenick, 
2006). 
These definitions are not entirely equivalent. Some of 
them focus on one defining characteristic of the 
production (interactive art) while others focus on the 
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technologies involved (computer art), or are extremely 
general (art and technology). 
The common denominator, which sometimes goes 
unnoticed, is that they refer to art that uses 
technology as a medium. Christiane Paul’s quote 
specifies digital technology in what becomes an 
unnecessary restriction. Although it is true that digital 
technology offers a natural and extremely rich 
environment for art production, the processes are not 
confined to any particular kind of technology. 
New media art’s constant evolution both complicates 
and fosters its study; in effect, there is a large and rich 
body of literature analysing its practices. 
However, in spite of this popularity, there are 
systematic problems in its characterisation: not only 
there is an exaggerated focus on the details of the 
technology involved; but also - the main thesis of this 
paper - two characteristics that distinguish the area 
and allow the development of an original artistic 
language are systematically overlooked or 
misunderstood. These characteristics are media 
appropriation, and explicitation. 
The focusing on the specific technology is easy to 
understand, as the technological components often 
constitute particularly visible or demanding aspects of 
the piece. Moreover, when artists themselves attempt 
to develop an analysing rhetoric, new technologies are 
often seen as new means of semantic production, 
and their incorporation can be exhilarating and convey 
feelings of freedom and empowerment. This has led 
to an explosion of literature and tools that aim at 
fuelling this empowerment by socialising some of the 
needed knowledge.  
One example of this would be computer 
programming. Lately, its appropriation by artists is 
often referred to as creative coding. In the last years a 
number of books and, more importantly, frameworks 
and tools, have appeared with the explicit intention of 
fostering its use by artists and designers (Laurenzo, 
2009). 
However, the underlying processes of appropriation 
are fundamentally independent from specific 
technologies. Even more, as technology is intrinsically 
mutable, new dynamics systematically appear in the 
arts that allow for cross-fertilization between 
technological and artistic realms. In Adamczyk, 
Hamilton, Twidale, and Bailey (2007) words: ‘a 
reciprocal relationship can be created between the 
practices of art and science that preserves disciplinary 
distinctiveness while challenging all participants in the 
areas where their respective disciplines are weakest’. 
In this paper, I refer to the artistic genre of ‘technology 
used as a medium’ as new media art.  Although as 
mentioned, many definitions have been proposed, 
mine is succinct: new media art is artistic media 
appropriation. 
2 | MEDIA APPROPRIATION 
Artistic appropriation refers to ‘the use of pre–existing 
objects or images with little transformation’ and 
constitutes a practice often associated with a critique 
of the notions of originality and authenticity (Chilvers & 
Glaves-Smith, 2010), the romantic concept of 
authorship, and of art itself, together with its 
associated social constructions such as galleries and 
museums.  
Artistic appropriation, perhaps best epitomized by 
Marcel Duchamp’s works Fountain (1917) and 
L.H.O.O.Q. (1919), has played a major role in the 
artistic production since early 20th century.  
This practice, once conceptually disruptive, in new 
media art ‘has become so common that it is almost 
taken for granted’ (Tribe et al., 2006). Digital 
technologies, with their inherent abilities of 
reproduction and mutation - after appropriation has 
been conceptually colonized - have provided an 
extremely rich playground for both appropriation and 
recontextualization.  
The practices of appropriation frequently come into 
conflict with copyright law; for example, Jeff Koons’s 
lost trials for copyright infringement (Landes, 2000). 
This conflict is deepened by digital new media art and 
its inherent reproducibility. 
Among the practices of appropriation art, 
‘readymades’ and ‘found art’ are examples of the 
most radical. In them, objects ranging from classic 
artworks, such as in L.H.O.O.Q., to everyday objects, 
such as in Michael Craig-Martin’s glass of water in An 
Oak Tree (Charnley, Pease, & Colton, 2012), are 
removed from their context and placed on display in 
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an art environment with little or no modification 
(Drucker, 2006). 
This artistic practice ignited a radical shift from object 
to concept; in Duchamp’s words a move from ‘retinal 
art’, with which he refers to the ‘interpretation of the 
visual world’, towards what became known as 
‘conceptual art’ (Drucker, 2006). In Sol LeWitt’s 
words, ‘The idea becomes a machine that makes the 
art’ (Kosuth, Guercio, & Lyotard, 1991). 
Conceptual art changed forever the conception of art. 
It implied not a shift from perception to concept but 
instead an expansion: art became something that, 
even if it still mostly exists as perceptual stimuli, 
cannot exist without cognitive reflection. Art can only 
exist when it talks about art; all art is conceptual, 
because art can only exist conceptually. As Kosuth et 
al. (1991) put it, ‘being an artist now means to 
question the nature of art’. 
Kosuth et al. also argue that there is no conceptual 
connection between art and aesthetics and leaves 
aside the inherent aestheticism of conceptual. I, 
instead, understand that art requires an aesthetic 
preoccupation; the artists’ conceptual quests always 
encompass a journey through an aesthetic axis. 
George Dickie’s (1974) Institutional Theory of Art, 
claims that what defines art is the context in which the 
work is placed or viewed, while Danto proposed that 
a piece’s status is dependent on the context and its 
relation to the time and environment in which it was 
made (Hernsberger, 2006). 
“To see something as art requires something 
the eye cannot descry – an atmosphere of 
artistic theory, a knowledge of the history of 
art: an artworld” (Hernsberger, 2006). 
“What in the end makes the difference 
between a Brillo box and a work of art 
consisting of a Brillo box is a certain theory of 
art. It is the theory that takes it up into the 
world of art, and keeps it from collapsing into 
the real object that it is (in a sense of is other 
than artistic identification”) (Danto, 1964).  
New media art actively reflects on its artworld. It is not 
that new media art includes a conceptual part, but, 
instead, that it only exists conceptually. New media art 
exists on the artistic conceptualization of technological 
processes and products. Otherwise it would be 
reduced to a technical exercise, it would become 
decoration, or engineering (or both: a decorating 
engineering more related to design practices). 
Conceptual art conveys the end of art: if art only 
exists in its self-reflection, if ‘art cannot exist outside of 
art’, it follows that art is only art when it becomes 
something that is not art, or, as Reinhardt put it, ‘art is 
always dead, and a “living” art is a deception’ (as 
cited in Lippard, 1967). Robert Filliou said: ‘art is what 
artists do’ (as cited in Kosuth et al., 1991), and I 
answer: art is what artists did. (However, I do agree 
with Fillou in his charming quasi tautology: “art is… 
what makes art more interesting” (as cited in Kosuth 
et al., 1991)). 
Even if appropriation has been part of the art practice 
for over a century, new media art, with its ‘intellectual 
parameters escaping disciplinary boundaries, 
asserting principles as much aesthetic as technical’ 
(Drucker, 2006), entails an ontologically different kind 
of appropriation, one that operates on the processes 
of production instead of, or in addition to, final 
products. 
This appropriation of the processes, which I call 
media appropriation, is a different process than 
traditional artistic appropriation and constitutes the 
main characteristic of new media art. 
New media artists adopt technology as an artistic raw 
medium by appropriating the knowledge that permits 
the creation of the technological artefacts. In this 
sense, technology creation becomes (or is able to 
become) artistic creation: the frontier between 
technological and artistic production disappears.  
This radically expands the landscape of possibilities: 
artists are not only users of technology but also 
creators, able to question, to subvert, and to escape 
from the aesthetic and functional premises offered by 
the technology involved. 
Media appropriation constitutes a strategy of 
empowerment and allows for a symbiotic relationship 
between art, technology and science, not only blurring 
their boundaries but also permitting their cross–
fertilization. 
The appropriation of the processes of technology 
creation implies the cognitive colonization of types of 
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knowledge production that are new to the art 
practice. It implies an appropriation of models of 
reality.  
These appropriations are not necessarily related to 
digital media. It is true that digital media provides a 
natural path for media appropriation, however it is 
possible to find new media art (i.e. to find media 
appropriation) that is not digital. 
One example of this is provided by Random Access, 
by Korean artist Nam-June Paik. Paik ‘stuck more 
than fifty strips of audio tape to a wall and asked 
users to “play” the segments by means of a play-back 
head that Paik had taken out of a reel-to-reel tape 
deck and wired to a pair of speakers’ (Paul, 2003). 
This deconstruction of the tape machine conforms a 
paradigmatic new media art object that appropriates 
and reclaims the aesthetic dimension of its inner 
workings creating an interactive art piece. Random 
Access is a piece that requires in its conception an 
appropriation of the tape machine’s working 
principles. 
If, as [Graham] Weinbren (1997) said, ‘the digital 
revolution is a revolution of random access’, Nam-
June Paik’s work prefigures a key feature of digital 
media without being digital. 
2.1 REPRESENTATION 
Marshal McLuhan’s most famous dictum ‘the medium 
is the message’ still provides an important tool in the 
analysing of media. McLuhan (1996) also stated that 
‘the “content” of any medium is always another 
medium. The content of writing is speech, just as the 
written word is the content of print, and print is the 
content of the telegraph’. 
Bolter and Grusin (2000) identify a systematic 
ekphrasis, which they call ‘remediation’ – the 
representation of one medium in another – and argue 
that it constitutes ‘a defining characteristic of the new 
digital media’. 
In effect, it is easy to find ‘recurring concepts’ in new 
media art; for example, many Dadaist strategies often 
reappear, including photomontage, collage, 
readymades, political action, and performance (Tribe 
et al., 2006), and it is very clear that Marcel Duchamp 
(among Cage, Man Ray, Warhol and many others) 
prefigured many of the new media art concepts, 
works, ideas and tendencies.  
“How one feels about Marcel Duchamp is, 
essentially, how one feels about a great deal 
of contemporary art” (Rush, 2005). 
The systematicity of the recurring concepts appears 
both at a large conceptual scale and at a more 
concrete, thematic scale. 
Jones (2002), for example, identifies the self–portrait 
as a ‘technology of embodiment’, in which technology 
‘not only mediates but produces subjectivities’. The 
photographic self–portrait of, for example, Claude 
Cahun in 1939 re–appears systematically in video 
installations and Web art. 
Also showing these recurring concepts, Best and 
Kellner (1999) state that ‘situationist ideas remain an 
important part of contemporary cultural theory and 
activism’, and argue that Debord's now classic 
Theory of the Spectacle, is still relevant in analysing 
contemporary society, especially contemporary 
interactive spectacles. 
This reappearance of themes is not, by any means, a 
new phenomenon. Instead, ‘we can identify the same 
process throughout the last several hundred years of 
Western visual representation. A painting by the 
seventeenth–century artist Pieter Saenredam, a 
photograph by Edward Weston, and a computer 
system for virtual reality are different in many 
important ways, but they are all attempts to achieve 
immediacy by ignoring or denying the presence of the 
medium and the act of mediation’ (Bolter & Grusin, 
2000). 
However, the speed with which new media changes, 
combined with the unspecificity of the digital 
computer, provide an unprecedented fertile field for 
remediation and recurring concepts. 
The systematicity of this recurrence is related to 
media appropriation. The inclusion of scientific and 
technological cognitive frameworks required a 
systematic revision of the proposals of conceptual art.  
If we assume that all art is conceptual, then 
appropriation from conceptual art requires the 
reviewing of the strategies of knowledge creation from 
within art. 
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It is intriguing that new media art, a cultural product 
potentially massive, has had to face so much 
resistance from both the artistic and technological 
fields; if a keen interest was to be found in technicians 
and scientists (although often biased towards the 
entertainment industry), the artworld of late twentieth 
century seemed to see new media art as a passing, 
shallow trend. 
It is particularly interesting that according to [Hervé] 
Fischer (2000), this resistance climaxed after the dawn 
of avant-garde, which left us facing a crisis where 
novelty has no intrinsic value, not being anymore a 
characteristic to look for. 
3 | THE DIGITAL COMPUTER 
Although the appropriation processes that define new 
media art are independent of how this appropriation 
occurs, the digital computer offers a natural, 
extremely powerful, and ubiquitous path of 
appropriation (up to the point that most of the 
literature confuses both things: the mechanisms of 
appropriation with the appropriation itself). 
Digital media have been central objects of study in 
every attempt at understanding new media art. 
Understandably so, as we are experiencing ‘the shift 
of all of our culture to computer–mediated forms of 
production, distribution and communication’ 
(Manovich, 2002). 
The digital computer’s radical novelty resides in its 
unspecificity. Even though analogue manipulation of, 
for example, electromagnetic waves can be found as 
early as late XIX century, (with Tesla’s experiments on 
electricity in 1891), the construction of an 
electromechanical device for data manipulation, until 
computers, always existed for a pre-given purpose.  
The digital revolution is a revolution of freedom 
(Laurenzo, 2009).  
Even if ‘ultimately, every object is about its own 
materiality, which informs the ways in which it creates 
meaning’ (Paul, 2003), it is needed to sidestep the 
discussion of “the digitality”, to study the artistic 
language of new media art. I propose that this 
language has its roots in the phenomenon of 
explicitation. 
4 | EXPLICITATION 
“Oil painters use a controlled random process 
(centuries before John Cage made such a big 
deal about it)” (Perlin, 2002). 
It is thanks to the existence of a language of new 
media art that we can talk about new media artworks 
without stopping on the technical details of how they 
were created. 
The quote by Perlin describes a specific technology - 
the use of random processes - being part of art for a 
long time. However, Perlin accuses Cage of making 
‘such a big deal about it’, under the assumption that 
Cage focused on the use of this technology. 
New media art literature often does not notice the 
fundamental factor of new media art’s appropriation, 
that is, the construction of an artistic language that is 
made with technological production.  
In the example, the adoption of a technology of 
randomness allows to operate in the realm of this 
technology as an art practice.  
However, using a certain new technology does not 
equal to new media art. For example, the volitional 
insertion of a process of controlled randomness is not 
an indicator of new media art. Modern artists such as 
Mark Rothko or Robert Rauschenberg introduced 
chance to their process. Rauschenberg, for example, 
was known to buy paint in unmarked cans at the 
hardware store (Gambino, 2011). 
Rauschenberg’s deliberate randomization of the 
colour choosing process constitutes a reflection on 
the role that colour plays in painting and within 
painting. 
Quoting Kosuth et al. (1991) again: ‘The event that 
made conceivable the realization that it was possible 
to “speak another language” and still make sense in 
art was Duchamp’s first unassisted readymade. With 
the unassisted readymade, art changed its focus from 
the form of the language to what was being said’.  
New media art requires this conceptual migration: it 
needs to ‘speak another language’ created by media 
appropriation. 
I have already indicated that many themes of 
‘traditional’ art appear once and again in new media 
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art. In spite of this, new media art maintains its identity 
and builds its own original artistic language. One of 
the main characteristics of this language consists in 
the incorporation of implicit traits of traditional art into 
the artistic vocabulary. 
Under this light, new media art (partially) is the art of 
making explicit. 
The language of new media art comprises the 
explicitation of some characteristics of traditional art. 
By making them explicit, it becomes possible to 
articulate with them. In terms of a new language, 
these already existent underlying aspects become 
constituent parts.  
Randomness was an implicit characteristic of oil 
painting. The characteristics of this random process 
were not part of the art practice: the tool (the 
paintbrush) is external to the art of painting, and its 
creation occurs in a conceptually different moment: it 
is never considered as part of the art creation 
process. 
This shift from implicit to explicit of some 
characteristics present on traditional art does not only 
occur with randomness but systematically appears on 
every interaction between art and technology. 
Interaction that is as old as art itself, for technology 
has always played a defining role in art. 
In this way, every art practice that requires tools of art 
creation (instruments) establishes a specific 
relationship with technology. And even if these tools 
are sometimes created in processes inextricably 
linked to their particular art practice, they are never 
considered part of the artworks produced with them. 
Luthiers, for example, create musical instruments that 
transform the artist’s gestures into sounds (Jordà, 
2004). However, the construction of a violin is not 
music. 
Media appropriation always acts as the defining trait 
of new media art. In this case, the appropriation of the 
processes and the technology behind the creation of 
the instruments is able to generate a new artistic path: 
one where the instrument creation is part of the art 
production process.  
When the luthier’s knowledge is artistically 
appropriated, instruments composed by artists 
effectively augment the landscape of artistic 
possibilities.  
New media art’s systematic appropriation operates as 
a traversing of the axis implicit-explicit. Many implicit 
relationships between art and technology, by means 
of the appropriation, become explicit and therefore 
they are amenable to become part of the art. 
Another example of non-digital new media art is 
provided by John Cage’s ‘Instructions on how to 
prepare a piano’. Here, not only the technology of the 
instrument is being appropriated and inserted into the 
artistic performance, but, perhaps more importantly, 
Cage hints a second appropriation: that of the 
technology of giving instructions.  
5 | PROGRAMMING ART 
One of the most common examples of programming 
in art - in a loose and informal acceptation - is 
provided by music. In it we have the sheet music: a 
description on how the art performance should be 
carried on. Music sheets play a very interesting role 
within the art taxonomy, for they exist in an 
intermediate state that is taken out of the art. In effect, 
the first artistic event occurs at composition time. The 
composer engages in an art performance that 
generates a testimony of itself: the music sheet. But 
the music sheet is never a piece of art, it is a 
description of the art, it exists outside the art, and it is 
not appreciated as an artwork on itself. If one is found 
at a museum is it simply as a historical annotation, a 
reminder, of an artistic event associated with it. 
The music sheet then becomes part of a second 
artistic event: the interpretation of the music. The 
following of the instructions coded in it, by musicians, 
to generate a new, disjoint art performance: the music 
itself. 
Instructions on how to carry an artistic performance 
have been included into the artistic practice long time 
ago and became a common strategy of conceptual 
artists. For example, Sol LeWitt ‘whose instructions 
for several series of geometric shapes or detailed 
line drawings, made directly on the wall surface, 
sometimes took teams of people days or weeks to 
execute.’ (Boyle, Gonzalez, Johnson, Pau, & 
Wetterlund, 2006). 
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Many other important and inspiring examples of 
instruction-based art are easy to find, among many 
others John Cage, Yoko Ono, and La Monte Young, 
were particularly influential. 
These all are works of conceptual art, for they are 
about art and the process of art creation, 
consumption, authorship, and exhibition. They are 
seminal, inspiring, and moving, but they do not 
appropriate the technology of instructions. 
This is another clear example of the process of 
explicitation that new media art encompasses. These 
works, however conceptually revolutionary, 
considered the instructions as something given, 
something that is not interpellated because it does not 
belong to the artwork. Its result belongs, its execution, 
but not its technology, or its design. 
Among La Monte Young’s 1960 compositions, there 
is one that is perhaps his best-known artwork. It 
consists of only one instruction: ‘draw a straight line 
and follow it’. Young is questioning the nature of the 
instructional paradigm, hinting on its artistic 
appropriation.  
Instructions have a long history; the assignment or 
delegation of labour is as old as technology itself and 
every assignment requires instructions, that is, a 
description of the tasks to be executed.  
These instructions can be implicit and codified in 
tools, or explicit, as a set of oral, written, or drawn 
directives. One can say that a starter crank, for 
example, embodied in its affordances the instructions 
on how to start a car engine. 
In the digital realm, giving instructions to a computer is 
often equal to programming. 
It is impossible to overestimate the importance of 
software. As Manovich (2013) puts it, ‘software has 
become our interface to the world, to others, to our 
memory and our imagination - a universal language 
through which the world speaks, and a universal 
engine on which the world runs’. 
In effect, in spite of us having been able to identify 
historical new media processes that are separated 
from the digitality, nowadays almost all media are 
digital media, and are manipulated by certain 
automatic processes. 
The digital computer, thanks to software, can be then 
considered not as a medium, but as a ‘meta–
medium’, ‘a combination of existing, new, and yet to 
be invented media’ (Manovich, 2013). This is 
equivalent to state that new media’s appropriation has 
become an inextricable part of it: we conceptualize 
the digital from its ability to function as an 
appropriating tool. 
The omnivorousness of new media art is rooted on its 
core and is propelled by the ubiquity of software, 
which acts as a catapulting agent, as a starting point 
for new appropriations, and very often as the sole 
technology that enables the appropriation. 
6 | THE ART OF INTERACTION 
“The creative act is not performed by the 
artist alone; the spectator brings the work in 
contact with the external world by 
deciphering and interpreting its inner 
qualifications and thus adds his contribution 
to the creative act.” (Duchamp, 1957) 
“Since 1969, I have been trying to raise 
interactivity to the level of an art form as 
opposed to making art work that happened 
to be interactive.” Myron Krueger (as cited in 
Mitchell, 1999) 
Marcel Duchamp’s quote shows interactive art being 
a form of explicitation. Every artwork is interactive 
needing the spectator to complete it, but it is new 
media art’s explicitation what allows interaction itself 
to become part of the artwork. 
Interactivity is not, then, an ‘added flavour’ of 
otherwise traditional art. Interactivity’s own aesthetics 
conforms a unique field of artistic production and 
experimentation. We are not saying that ‘the whole is 
more than the sum of the parts’ but that the whole is 
different, incomparable, it’s conceptual centre-of-
mass is situated on an orthogonal axis that allows for 
comparison only in the meta-artistic languages of art 
analysis’ rhetoric. 
Explicitly interactive art subverts the traditional 
conception of the relationship between an active 
emitter and a passive receiver that traditional art 
presents. 
 
 CITAR JOURNAL 
 34 
Our contemporary conception of explicitly interactive 
art often requires the computational substratum, for it 
usually takes the form of computer art. Again, the 
computer’s versatility comes to play a fundamental 
role, but, also, the historical process of interactive art 
is inextricably linked to the digitality. 
The appropriation of interaction and the exploration of 
the aesthetics of interaction require to cognitively 
operate in the verbal dimension of an interaction that 
unfolds in time. In the words of [Martin] Rieser (2002): 
‘[the art objects] can only become truly interactive 
when authors attempt to transcend the established 
syntax of earlier forms and the platitudes of 
multimedia and invent a coherent artistic language for 
interaction’.   
New media art, then, can be seen as an art practice 
that requires to operate artistically in the technological 
realm. Media appropriation results in the creation of 
new materialities that dialectically construct the art 
experience.  
Coherently, the creation of a rhetoric that analyses 
new media art requires a discourse that cognitively 
colonizes the involved technology. 
7 | CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has presented a novel characterization of 
new media art together with an exploration of some 
key aspects of its practice. In it, I propose that new 
media art is artistic media appropriation. 
With media appropriation I refer to the dialectal 
inscription into the art practice of the knowledge that 
allows for some particular technological production. 
Media appropriation implies to cognitively colonise the 
modes of thought that allowed for the technological 
creations.  
However, in order to construct an analysis of new 
media art, knowledge of its materiality is needed. New 
media art’s materiality is unspecific, for the art 
practice occurs when the knowledge crystallized in 
technological artefacts and processes is appropriated. 
The relationship between art and technology is as old 
as any of them; however, media appropriation 
transforms technology into a raw medium, allowing for 
the appearance of the artistic practice of technology 
production.  
This practice is by no means tied to the digital; new 
media art is unspecific on its materiality. Nevertheless, 
the digital computer became the natural vehicle for 
new media art, and software evolved into its common 
denominator.  
New media art’s relationship with other cultural and 
artistic genres and methods is, truly to its 
appropriating nature, one of omnivorousness. As 
Steve Dietz put it, new media art is ‘just like anything 
else, only different’ (as cited in Graham & Cook, 
2010).  
The difference resides on media appropriation, which 
generates a qualitative difference in the relationship 
with the technological substratum, with the artworld, 
and with the technology production. Effectively, new 
media art’s appropriations subvert many of the 
assumed stances in the relationship with technology.  
An example of this subversion is provided by new 
media art’s reclaiming of the aesthetics of the 
computer interface.  
A long-standing desire of many researchers on 
Human-Computer Interaction has been the 
disappearance of the interface. New media art, 
instead, has many times worked on making the 
interface explicit, on reclaiming it as an aesthetic 
subject, on creating the art of the interface, or the art 
of interaction. 
This explicitation, I have shown, appears 
systematically in new media art, and plays a significant 
role in the creation of new media art’s language.  
New media art not only adopts technological 
knowledge, but also makes explicit procedures, 
technologies, and techniques already present in more 
traditional art practices. This change from implicit 
realm to explicit allows for the construction of an 
artistic language that uses this knowledge. 
When Zicarelli says ‘I would only observe that in most 
high profile gigs, failure tends to be far more 
interesting to the audience than success’ (as cited in 
Cascone, 2000), he is, at least in part, referring to this 
explicitation. Part of the appeal of the aesthetics of 
error and glitch resides on they making explicit the 
underlying technological substrate.  
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New media art’s media appropriation embraces its 
constant change. Being technology extremely 
dynamic, new media art, as Ippolito (2008) poses, is 
‘like a shark’ for it ‘must keep moving to survive’, that 
is, new media art’s condenses itself in artworks of an 
ever-changing nature. 
The defining role of knowledge in new media art is not 
casual, for new media art is intrinsically conceptual. It 
is this what converts it into an art genre as opposed 
to an anecdotal technical exercise.  
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